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Karl Llewellyn was America's leading legal realist, academic law reformer,
and contract law theorist. There are extensive analyses of Llewellyn's perfor-
mance as a realist and reformer, but his contracts scholarship, written between
1925 and 1940, has not been seriously analyzed.1 As an example, William
Twining's famous study answered the question of what of Llewellyn should be
read today as follows: "A number of essays on specific topics are still of
value, and this is particularly the case with most of the articles on contract and
commercial law of the middle period." But Twining did not analyze any of
these articles in detail in a 533-page book.2 Similarly, a recent major collection
of readings on legal realism has a single chapter on contracts that is twenty-one
pages long and has only a two-page excerpt from one Llewellyn contracts
article — (3) — that does not set out his views on any contract issue.3 Modern
scholars commonly infer Llewellyn's views on contract theory from early
drafts of the Uniform Commercial Code, from the Code itself, or from
Llewellyn's later jurisprudential writings.4
The attention that modern scholars pay to Llewellyn and a citation analysis
of his work confirm that Llewellyn's contract theory has current relevance.5
This chapter evaluates the theory through an analysis of the contracts articles
themselves. Turning to the sources sometimes is unnecessary for a figure who
is as well known as Llewellyn, but is necessary here because the usual refer-
ences are not illuminating. UCC drafts, especially those after 1941, reflected
the work of several authors as well as what it was politically acceptable to say.6
There also are marked differences between the Llewellyn to whom modern
scholars commonly refer and the Llewellyn who created the theory (or perhaps
differences between the earlier and later Llewellyns).7
That Llewellyn's contracts scholarship is largely unread is unsurprising:
The articles are opaque to nonspecialists and difficult even for experts. The
readability problem should be stressed at the outset because it renders tentative
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any conclusions about what Llewellyn actually believed. The problem does not
stem from Llewellyn's inability to write an English sentence or his colorful
prose. Llewellyn could write lucidly, but the papers are difficult because
Llewellyn pursued multiple objectives when writing them, and overestimated
the typical reader's knowledge. A discussion of warranty, for example, will
also be a discussion about why warranty doctrine was often confused and how
sales law should be regulated generally. Llewellyn commonly expressed views
on such issues interstitially, in the context of historical discussions of the law
and of business practice (as Llewellyn conceived it) that ranged over a century
and covered England and the United States. The papers also assume an au-
dience who had read everything Llewellyn had read, and who had it as clearly
in mind when reading as Llewellyn had when writing. Thus the warranty
articles cite over a hundred cases but give the facts of a handful; readers
apparently are expected to know the facts and holdings of the other cases. A
criticism of the rules respecting a buyer's rights when receiving a defective
tender assumes that readers know the nineteenth and twentieth century law on
conditions, waiver, and damages. Nonspecialists quickly get lost and special-
ists have problems. These difficulties and others detailed below imply that no
interpretation can be definitive, and this one attempts to be cautious.
Before turning to Llewellyn's theory, a few remarks should be made about
this chapter's nature and scope. The chapter treats Llewellyn's contracts arti-
cles as if they were chapters in the same book. This ahistorical approach to
Llewellyn's thought is taken for two reasons. First, ten of the thirteen works
were written between 1936 and 1940, and so were contemporaneous in fact.
Second, while his analysis grew richer in the period analyzed here, Llewellyn's
basic views did not change.
Turning to issues of scope, to understand a theoretical contribution fully
requires at least these inquiries: (1) What was the state of theory when the
contribution was made? (2) What led up to that state and what changed later?
(3) What was the context of discovery for the scholar himself (what did he
personally know, read, and so forth)? (4) What was the social setting in the
profession (how were new ideas received)? (5) What cultural and ideological
factors outside the field of study were influential? (6) What epistemological
and thematic notions {i.e., what would a good theory be like?) did the scholar
hold? There has been little scholarship concerning questions (1), (3), (4), and
(6) in connection with Llewellyn's contract theory, and not a great deal on (2)
and (5). No chapter-length treatment can fill this gap. This chapter's contribu-
tion rather is to set out the theory itself in a preliminary way, to evaluate this
tentative rendering, and to make a few speculations concerning the second and
sixth inquiries.
Part II below sets out Llewellyn's theory as a whole and without citation to
the work. Documentation, illustration, and critique follow. This part attempts
to do what Llewellyn did not—to set the theory out in one place. As said above,
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Llewellyn scattered his theoretical ideas interstitially throughout his writings.
Turning directly to the articles thus would be confusing. Part III begins with an
illustration of Llewellyn's approach to resolving sales issues, then shows how
he thought custom could illuminate adjudication and rule making, and finally
elaborates the institutional aspect of the theory—what legal rules could do, who
should make them, and what form they should take. Part IV illustrates how
Llewellyn found what he believed were the real legal rules (as contrasted with
the rules that were taught in law schools), and then analyzes typical Llewellyn
law reform proposals. The object here is to see how Llewellyn attempted to
solve concrete problems. Part V next examines the freedom of contract aspect
of Llewellyn's theory, which has the greatest contemporary relevance. Part VI
is a conclusion.
An essay about Llewellyn's contract theory could have two sets of ad-
dressees: scholars working today on contract or sales issues who may look to
the theory for illumination; and scholars interested in Llewellyn's other work
or in legal realism, who may want to know what light Llewellyn's contract
theory throws on these broader matters. This essay is addressed primarily to the
former group. It argues that Llewellyn's general approach to the legal regula-
tion of contracts remains valuable but his solutions to specific legal problems
often are unhelpful. This partly is because many of the economic techniques
needed to analyze these problems had not been developed when Llewellyn
wrote. Llewellyn's limited knowledge of actual commercial behavior and his
failure to pursue his ideas systematically also flawed the work. Regarding this
chapter's broader implications, many of the notes below form a subtext that
argues that there are important inconsistencies between what Llewellyn and
other realists are said to believe and the ideas expressed in Llewellyn's contract
articles. This subtext is briefly developed in the conclusion.
II. The Theory
Llewellyn's contract theory was meant to tell decisionmakers how to regulate
sales transactions. The decisionmakers in the theory were courts and law
reform organizations such as the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws; legislatures played a minor role. The theory had a sub-
stantive aspect (what the legal rules should be) and an institutional aspect
(which legal institutions should make the rules and what form the rules should
take). Both aspects of the theory implied views that would be regarded as
conventional in today's law and economics world.
A theory directed to decisionmakers should identify and motivate its norms.
Law reformers then were concerned with efficiency and redistribution.
Llewellyn believed that distributional goals had no place in a contract theory
because the commercial actors in the theory commonly occupied the two
relevant roles of buyer and seller. This multiplicity of roles would vitiate the
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pursuit of distributional ends, for what a party would gain when wearing her
seller hat she would lose when wearing her buyer hat. The regnant norm in
Llewellyn's contract theory thus was efficiency, as then understood. Llewellyn
never explicitly justified the pursuit of efficiency. Rather, he believed that
American society had accepted the efficiency norm and he did as well.
A. The Substantive Aspect
The substantive aspect of Llewellyn's contract theory followed from four
premises:
1. Courts should interpret contracts in light of the parties' commercial objec-
tives and the context in which they dealt.
2. Decisionmakers should complete incomplete contracts with rules that re-
flect the deal typical parties would make in the circumstances.
3. A court should not enforce a contract without an independent inquiry into
its substantive fairness if one party's consent to the contract was unconscio-
nably procured.
4. Decisionmakers should reduce the transaction costs of doing deals.
Versions of these premises (except perhaps the fourth) were held by others
when Llewellyn wrote. Llewellyn took the first two premises more seriously
than his contemporaries did, however. He believed that the typical court or law
reformer viewed the commercial world through the distorting lens of taught
legal doctrine. This produced the incorrect interpretations and flawed rules that
much of his work sought to correct. Llewellyn also was more concerned than
other scholars of his time with the question of when the state should restrict
private contract. The most original aspect of Llewellyn's work, however, lay
not in his recognition of the relevance of these four premises, but rather in the
many provocative substantive and institutional implications he drew from
them.
Law and economics scholars today commonly attempt to develop contract
rules by identifying the cost-minimizing solution to a contracting problem.
Thus, an analyst will develop a model to show what contract term respecting
damages would be efficient for a particular transaction type. The scholar then
will recommend that the law adopt this term as the default solution when the
parties' contract is silent concerning damages. Llewellyn seldom worked in
this way because the economics of his time were too primitive. Continuing
with the example, optimal contract terms respecting damages today are derived
as the equilibria of asymmetric information contracting games.8 Game theory
had not been developed when Llewellyn wrote, so he could not identify game
theoretic solutions to the particular contracting problems his theory had to
solve.
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Llewellyn thus worked "indirectly": He used commercial practice as the
best evidence of the efficient transaction. Parties, he believed, pursued their
self-interest when contracting (maximized their expected utility). Hence, the
parties' consent to a deal was good evidence that the deal was efficient. It was
this method of analysis that made Llewellyn sensitive to freedom of contract
issues. When one party dictated the contract terms, an analyst could infer only
that those terms maximized the utility of the powerful party, not that the deal
was globally efficient. Dictation would occur, in Llewellyn's view, if one party
had structural market power or was more knowledgeable or sophisticated than
the other. Such "flat contracts" lacked the epistemological relevance of "bar-
gained for" contracts. Consequently, courts must make an independent inquiry
into a contract's normative suitability when a party's consent to the contract
was not conscionably procured. To use practice as evidence of efficiency, that
is, requires a theory of unconscionability.9
Llewellyn also interestingly pursued several implications of his epistemo-
logical view that common practice commonly is efficient. The typical judge, he
thought, seldom could discern the parties' commercial goals, but a judge could
become sophisticated by repeated acquaintance with the facts. Thus Llewellyn
was ambivalent regarding the ability of courts to develop good commercial law
rules. Judges of unusual ability with an interest in commerce could do well, as
could judges on courts that saw many commercial cases. But the ordinary
judge needed help. Such judges could find help from three sources: arbitrators,
custom, and trade association rules. Arbitrators were helpful, in Llewellyn's
view, because they had the expertise to identify the deal the parties actually
made.
Llewellyn had a nuanced view of custom and trade associations. He be-
lieved that trade custom could be good evidence of the efficient arrangement,
but also that the existence of a custom often was irrelevant to adjudication.
Custom commonly is challenged in law suits: The party against whom the
custom is asserted claims that the custom does not exist or does not apply to the
case at bar. Llewellyn was sympathetic to these challenges. Customs, he
thought, reflected the solutions to normal business problems, but the disputes
that came to court often were caused by exogenous economic shocks. A
custom meant to govern in normal times could shed no light on the efficient
resolution of unusual — "trouble" — cases. Rather, the court or law reformer
must develop the best solution directly.
Llewellyn was similarly cautious regarding the epistemological relevance
of trade association rules. If all parties whom a rule affects are represented in
the trade association, the rule is a contract between parties of equal bargaining
power, and as such is good evidence of the efficient arrangement. Trade
associations, however, often imposed rules on outsiders such as unorganized
consumers, and these rules were like contracts between parties of unequal
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bargaining power; one could not conclude that such a rule was efficient just
because the sophisticated side of the market liked it.
To summarize the substantive aspect of Llewellyn's thought, Llewellyn
believed that decisionmakers should enforce, facilitate, and enact efficient
commercial arrangements. The decisionmaker could infer the efficient solution
from what parties commonly did. Llewellyn's frequent references to the par-
ties' goals, their deals, custom, and rules of the trade thus were epistemological
in intention. What is out there is evidence, but not always reliable evidence, of
what maximizes social welfare. Contrary to Llewellyn's reputation among
some modern scholars, he did not believe that decisionmakers could infer
values from facts, nor did he think that the state should delegate lawmaking
power to private groups.
When practice did not supply reliable evidence of efficiency, Llewellyn
sometimes would derive the transaction cost-minimizing solution directly. For
example, he argued that sellers should be permitted to sue for the price when
buyers rejected in distant markets. After rejection, either the buyer or the
seller could mitigate damages by reselling the goods. A successful price action
would force the buyer to resell because the buyer would become the owner. It
is efficient to make distant rejecting buyers resell because these buyers have a
comparative advantage at maximizing resale revenue: The goods are in the
buyer's market, and the buyer commonly knows that market well.
B. The Institutional Aspect
Contract law rules performed three functions in Llewellyn's theory: to fill gaps
in incomplete contracts; to develop and apply appropriate constraints on the
parties' freedom to contract; and to direct or "channel" the adjudicator's fact-
finding function. Creating rules to perform these functions requires expertise,
and the rules themselves must be clear. The need for expertise underlay
Llewellyn's view that commercial law rules are best created by administrative
agencies or specialized law reform organizations. Llewellyn's stress on rule
clarity presupposed the ability of rules to guide parties and constrain courts,
and Llewellyn accepted this presupposition. Rule scepticism played no role in
his theory. Legal rules, he thought, also should ask courts to find facts - which
party had possession of the goods when the fire struck? - rather than require
conceptual analysis - which party had title when the fire struck? Llewellyn,
however, rejected conceptual analysis only at the level of rule application.
Otherwise, he admired this form of analysis and sometimes did it.
Llewellyn's thought about rules written for commercial codes was a major
exception to these views. Llewellyn believed that codes were difficult to
amend, and so would have to be applied in quite varied commercial circum-
stances. As a consequence, code rules should not reflect solutions to specific
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contracting problems, but rather should constitute normative premises for
reasoning or channel the courts' fact-finding function. Llewellyn's position
concerning the appropriate level of abstraction for UCC rules thus did not
reflect his thought on rules generally.
C. Critique
Llewellyn's general substantive and institutional approaches to sales and con-
tract law rules remain relevant. Modern law and economics scholars believe,
with Llewellyn, that the state should pursue efficiency in the contract area
because efficiency is the only implementable goal. And efficiency should be
pursued, by and large, in the ways that Llewellyn advocated: Courts should
enforce the deals that parties make, which requires courts to understand the
economics of commercial transactions; and doctrine or statute should attempt
to reduce the costs to parties of making deals by choosing as the default
solution the efficient contract term. Llewellyn's major achievement was to
develop this general approach to the legal analysis of contract.
Many of Llewellyn's specific analyses, however, rest on errors and it is
therefore a mistake to rely on his recommendations for what should be done in
concrete cases. Without the concepts and tools of modern economic analysis,
Llewellyn could not understand how market power is acquired and exercised,
and so his unconscionability theories are too primitive. He did have perceptive
insights respecting when rules should be mandatory or defaults and which
transaction costs the state likely could reduce. But because Llewellyn could not
understand these concepts as moderns do, his work often is unhelpful. It must
also be said, however, that Llewellyn sometimes did not satisfy the standards
of his time. Other realists recognized that more can be learned about the world
by studying it directly than can be learned from Llewellyn's method of reading
appellate opinions with particular attention to the facts. And consistency in
thought has always been a virtue. A perhaps illuminating way to summarize
this chapter's critique is to remark that Newton's theory remains true over
much of the domain it was created to explain, but a fair amount of Llewellyn's
work is not true in this sense because it never was true.
III. Norms, Rules and Institutions
A. Norms and the Basic Approach
Llewellyn believed that distributional goals played no role in a contract theory.
He explained that "most of the Sales Field is uncolored as most other law is not
by the clash of class and passion," because "the same parties, and the same
types of party, can tomorrow be occupying each the other end of similar
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disputes."10 Rather, sales law had to solve "practical" problems: "law and legal
rules are practical tools for practical men, and have as their job to center on
practical issues. And most conflicts of doctrine do just that."11 Turning to these
practical issues, Llewellyn asked, "What, then, are the problems with which it
is the business of the mercantile law of Sales to cope? They turn chiefly about
occasional hitches in the process known to economists as distribution (which
includes assembling), to business-schools as marketing, . . . to lawyers as
formation and performance of contract. . . ."12
Decisionmakers need a source of policy to resolve even practical issues.
Llewellyn sought to increase efficiency by enforcing the parties' deal: Parties
should be permitted to make "any contract they please" because "the animals
probably knew their own business better than their keeper did—a theory which
has not only charm but virtue, most of the time."13 On a slightly more abstract
level, "business has been the biggest single man-made fact in our living."14
Courts therefore have not "failed to reflect the sound American point of view
that it is business which makes the wheels go round" and thus "have felt it good
to favor" commerce.15 In a similar vein, Llewellyn observed that Americans
live "in a bargain economy," and that if courts are to enforce contracts,
"Benefit of the bargain is the sane standard for a court to enforce by." This also
is the law: "Our policy is fixed in most cases in terms of purporting to award
Benefit of the Bargain. I think the choice is wise."16
Llewellyn's adoption of premise (1), that courts should implement the
parties' goals, is nicely illustrated by his view of warranty law. He approved of
the Uniform Sales Act warranty and presumption rules because these "seek less
to lay down controlling rules than to standardize, on the basis of the most
general practice discernable, the probable meaning of the acts or words con-
cerned to most bargainers concerned, and to give effect to that meaning. . . .
And this, in my view, is the sound basic approach to regulative law about
socially unobjectionable transactions which can be reasonably standardized,
and where bargaining power is moderately balanced or fair dealing is the
practice."17 The parties' meaning is reflected in their contract. Thus, warranty
law should be put "on a contract basis"18: ". . . in the normal modern case the
first measure of the parties' rights is not the seller's conduct but the seller's
contract. . . . Every problem of modern sales law splits into two major lines of
inquiry: according to whether the seller's action does or does not conform with
that contract. . . ,"19
When a contract was incomplete, the court should ask what quality risk the
typical seller would assume (this is premise (2)). In the early part of the
nineteenth century, that seller was a wholesaler or factor who purchased goods
in sealed packages from a distant merchant. The factor thus "sells wares of
whose origin, growth, manufacture, handling, packaging, he can have no
personal knowledge and may not have even hearsay. Is such a seller to be held
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to quality responsibility unless he [explicitly] warrants?"20 Because sellers
would not warrant without knowledge of product quality and buyers would
know this, the typical deal would reflect the rule of caveat emptor.
A counter-rule grew "out of factorage, but out of busier factorage." Under
caveat emptor, the buyer must make a "full examination of the wares" before
acceptance. A seller who warrants that the sample he or she exhibits fairly
represents the bulk will "speed turnover" because the warranty substitutes for
buyer inspection. The warranty also would increase seller costs, but (the
exogenously caused) growth in nineteenth century American commerce would
have permitted such a seller to "cover with increased commissions any seller's
responsibilities assumed." Therefore, courts who recognized a trade usage that
samples are taken to represent the bulk, and who " 'imposed' implied warran-
ties . . . are creating merchants' law for merchants, where farmers' law has
ceased visibly to cover merchants' needs."21 Many courts, however, took a
long time to understand that they should imply the sample warranty because
"either view [of the quality obligation the seller must assume] is a view for the
passionate furtherance of trade."
The warranty example illustrates the creativity of Llewellyn's approach to
creating sales law rules. Llewellyn did not ask what rule sellers and buyers in
general would want, but rather what rule parties would agree to given their
particular circumstances. This focus on context implied the conclusion that
caveat emptor was once the better rule for allocating the risk of nonconforming
goods. When commercial circumstances changed, the parties' rule preferences
should change as well. Thus, when the volume of trade increased, the increased
costs to sellers of making warranties would be more than offset by the gain
from additional business. Sellers in this new circumstance would want to
warrant. Hence, the law should change so that sellers are taken to make an
implied sample warranty when the contract is silent. As also is typical, the
economics of Llewellyn's argument are a little off: The volume of trade is
irrelevant to the question of which quality risk allocation is efficient; rather, the
question is whether factors or retailers could infer the nature of the bulk from
the sample more cheaply. For if the costs to factors of learning what the bulk is
like are higher than the costs to their buyers of learning this, then a factor could
not recover the higher inspection cost attributable to the warranty by selling
more goods.22
B. The Relevance of Custom
It is a commonplace that custom played an important role in Llewellyn's
theory, but a disagreement exists as to what that role was. The claim here is that
custom had epistemological relevance. The first two premises in Llewellyn's
theory held that courts should interpret contracts to achieve the parties' goals,
and that decisionmakers should complete contracts with rules that typical
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parties would accept. Custom is relevant to decisionmakers, then, to the extent
that it evidences what commercial parties want.23 In contrast, modern scholars
hold that realists, in particular Llewellyn, urged courts to find in commercial
practice the norms with which to resolve business disputes.24 The articles
analyzed here contradict this view.
There are two reasons for custom not to be an independent source of norms
for decisionmakers. First, custom often is unhelpful. The law resolves troubled
cases, and in troubled cases custom can run out.25 Llewellyn explained:
"Business understanding" of what an agreement means, and indeed of whether an
agreement exists, is by no means unambiguous and not always adjustable. It is not alone
wilful default, but honest difference of opinion, which leads to disputes, and which
leaves some proper room for law officials. Both ways and norms of business practice
may be firm at the center, but they are hazy at the edge; they offer little sureness to guide
in dealing with the outside or unusual case.26
The accompanying footnote added:
Practice is, however, rarely marked definitely enough to set a clear standard for judging
unusual cases. . . .A given trade may recognize unlimited cancellation as of right, in the
ordinary course. But in the ordinary course cancellations of given orders do not pile up.
Is the freedom to cancel to be regarded as holding equally in a cataclysmic market? One
main business of law is to set, to create, norms for such cases of conflicting or uncertain
expectation.27
Second, to let custom control is to make the cognitive mistake of suppress-
ing a moral premise. If the law is to enforce right conduct, then it cannot direct
a result just because it is the result many parties would reach. Rather, while
practice is relevant to decision, it is a separate question whether the usual result
is the normatively correct result. To decide cases only according to custom thus
is implicitly to assume that what is customary is also right.
Llewellyn did not make this assumption, but rather explicitly denied the
normativity of the actual. It was false to assert that the realist has "no interest
on his part for better law." The error of critics is to assume "that anyone
conceives that all law has to do is to follow society because in a particular
instance under discussion the following of society is urged to be the adjustment
needed."28 Llewellyn gives as an example that "banking practice" should
determine how much time a holder needs to present a check, but there remain
"certain regular abuses in the affiliate practices of the same banks" that the
state should curb.29 In a later analysis, he argued that buyers received too much
protection under the nineteenth century factors acts, and added, " . . . I hope the
doubts I have raised as to the wisdom of this full range of his protection under
the . . . [statutes] may guard me from any misinterpretation that I am urging the
protection of interests simply because they are, or of the market as it is because
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it is."30 When doing contract theory, Llewellyn did not attempt to deduce
ought from is, but rather sought to learn from and improve the is.31
C. The Nature, Function and Creation of Legal Rules
Llewellyn's substantive theory as applied to contract rules followed from
premises (2) and (4) above — that the rules should be defaults that either reflect
the terms that typical parties would adopt or reduce transactions costs. Rules
that achieve these functions have to constrain decisionmakers, who are re-
quired to apply the appropriate legal default, and guide parties, who need to
know what legal result will obtain unless they change the default. Rules that
can constrain courts and guide parties must be stated on a low level of gener-
ality. A rule that requires parties to behave "reasonably" thus is unsatisfactory
relative to a rule that imposes a particular risk on the seller if certain facts are
found to exist. Rules that impose commercial risks, in turn, are best created by
persons well informed about commerce. Llewellyn's substantive theory thus
had these institutional implications: Rules should be concrete; concrete rules
can constrain decisionmakers and guide parties; and the rules preferably
should be created by experts.
l. RULE FORM. Llewellyn believed that commercial law rules should be
concrete: "Nor can they [prevent disputes] if, when found, they are vague: 'do
right'; 'do not perpetrate a combination in restraint of trade. . . . The specific
character of administrative rules on those technical points which ethics and
even custom hardly touch, or touch with no uniformity, is an engineering
device of rare value."32 Llewellyn later softened this view, conceding that a
rule may be useful though "rather indeterminate in form"; such rules should be
"issue-pointing rules which marshall the relevant factors around the vital
criterion."33 Llewellyn's views on such concepts as "title" and "property in the
goods," however, illustrate his preference for the concrete.
This preference followed from his view of what questions a good legal rule
should require the decisionmaker to answer, not from a distaste for broad
analytical categories or conceptual analysis.34 Llewellyn disliked rules that
required courts to address questions to the facts that the facts could not directly
answer. Thus, the facts could tell who did what and when but could not tell
where "title" to the goods was because title is a legal concept. To be sure, a rule
holding that title was in party S if facts x and y were found, but otherwise was
in party B, could be applied intelligently. Where title was, however, determined
legal consequences, such as who bore the risk that the goods would be
destroyed before the contract was performed. As a consequence, a legal rule
could simply state that party S bore the risk of such a loss if facts x and y were
found but otherwise party B bore the risk. Title is "a wholly unnecessary major
premise."35 Making the application of a rule turn on legal concepts such as title
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is unwise as well as unnecessary. A rule meant to tell courts what questions to
address to the facts is more likely to be applied correctly if the rule requires an
explicit factual inquiry - did fact x exist? - rather than a conceptual inquiry -
where was title? As Llewellyn said in another context, meaningful rules are
defined by "operative fact" rather than "legal consequence."36 A meaningful
rule thus is specific, not abstract.37
Llewellyn's preference for precision in rule statement was not an objection
to the width of analytical categories in legal analysis or to the use of conceptual
analysis in general. Llewellyn disliked bad concepts, not concepts per se.38
Indeed, Llewellyn sometimes urged a widening of the then-regnant categories
of legal analysis. Thus, he argued that warranties and remedies should be
considered together because whether or not a warranty is found has meaning
only in so far as legal consequences flow.39 Llewellyn also considered warran-
ties in connection with other doctrines. For example, some nineteenth century
courts in his view correctly expanded the scope of the seller's quality obliga-
tion but then vitiated the expansion in face-to-face sales by taking the buyer to
waive defects when he or she accepted the goods: "no damage remedy survived
your accord and satisfaction."40 The courts' mistake was to treat the connected
issues of substantive liability and waiver as if they were separate.41 In accident
law, the appropriate category for analysis was not food but rather the unin-
formed consumer purchase of potentially dangerous products.42 Finally, the
field of contract law itself is too narrow an analytic category: The appropriate
category is "transactions," which should include corporate law and property.43
In Llewellyn's theory, wide analytical categories, conceptual analysis, and
concrete rules thus easily coexist. The former two modes of thought help the
scholar or decisionmaker to choose the appropriate rule, which in turn will
constrain courts and guide parties if cast in concrete form. Llewellyn departed
from these views only when considering rules that were to appear in a code. In
Llewellyn's view, codes differed from ordinary statutes along the dimension of
amendability: "a codiflcatory Act" is not "ordinary legislation" because "it is
not legislation capable of easy or frequent amendment; errors in it . . . are
rather to be suffered . . . over very considerable periods."44 Uniform laws
meant to codify fields had not been amended frequently when Llewellyn wrote,
but he provides only a mystical explanation: "The Code of a Field builds itself
into the life and work of men; it cannot be lightly altered."45 In any event, such
a code cannot "long answer the needs of a whole field. It therefore makes
judicial development (not mere 'interpretation') a necessity."46 A good code
should facilitate judicial development by stating principles and directing courts
to reason by analogy from them: Courts should be made to realize that "the act
is a freshly stated take-off from explicit, true common-law principle into the
common-law type of development of true common-law principle."47 There is
little or no evidence in these articles, however, indicating a Llewellyn belief
that a code is the best lawmaking vehicle.
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2. THE ABILITY OF RULES TO GUIDE AND CONSTRAIN. Llewellyn held
that doctrine is "a convenient and fairly accurate summation of past decisions
and of apparent trends, one which makes possible the intelligent decision of a
new case in the light of its bearing on doctrine and on life."48 Llewellyn thus
told students "that the examination gives no room at all for policy discussion
except after the positive rules prevailing have been brought into play upon the
problem; that policy discussion after the question is decided and the relevant
authorities considered will be welcome; otherwise disregarded."49 That rules
can decide cases implied for Llewellyn that, "Rules must be framed to hold
up — and hold down —judges who are not supermen."50 And also, "judges are
by no means free to be 'arbitrary', and must be held down and directed."51 This
is a common theme.52
Llewellyn at least once sought to demonstrate that rules could reduce
disputes. He analyzed two negotiable instruments principles, one dealing with
bona fide purchasers of commercial paper and the other requiring notice to
conditional obligors. The former principle "is expressed in the Negotiable
Instruments Law in rather broad language setting up standards"; the latter "is
expressed in a multitude of detailed rules." The former approach, Llewellyn
observed, generated far more litigation than the latter. Hence, "I conclude that,
along with principle, rules have their realm of service."53
Other evidence suggests that the Llewellyn of these articles did not believe
that law was best made by drafting statutes stating broad principles and then
letting courts apply the principles. Llewellyn remarked that judges "sit as
laymen groping to solve a controversy [in this case, chattel security law, but the
point was general] they cannot understand."54 A softer version of this view
pervades Llewellyn's early work, in which a constant theme held that the law
was often confused or wrong because courts did not understand commercial
situations. This failing could not be cured by giving courts vaguely worded
statutes to enforce. Llewellyn gave this example: Sellers financed sales early in
the nineteenth century, but by the 1870s, bank financing had become promi-
nent. The courts never perceived this switch, and so failed to read the Factors
Acts to facilitate bank financing.55 The early Acts, he concluded, were later
"mutilated in American seaboard courts . . . when the main fact picture which
the judge sees, knows . . . has come to change."56 Only statutes that tell courts
what questions to address to the facts can prevent such disasters.
Though Llewellyn believed that rules could constrain courts, it is too simple
to say that he defined law merely as a set of predictions of what the courts will
do.57 To be sure, he believed that, "If it is moderately clear how future cases
will come out, then a statement of that clarity is the Rule of Case-Law . . .
irrespective of whether it is a nice rule or a wise one or a just one."58 Statutes
also are controlling rules in this sense, whether the statutes are nice, wise, or
just. Llewellyn went further, though, to distinguish between rules for lawyers
and rules for courts. One could "challenge the title of rules for counselors to be
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called rules of law at all; for such rules are not normative; they command
nothing. . . . They are of the nature of a weather forecast. . . ,"59 In contrast,
the judge is to choose the "wise" or "just" rule.60 Rules for counselors can be
called rules, however, because the function of a rule is to guide conduct, and
counselors' rules do that. Nevertheless, the distinction between rules for law-
yers and rules for judges should always be kept clear.
3. RULE CREATION. Implementing the results of Llewellyn's contract theory
requires expertise. A court could develop expertise if it were presented with a
line of cases that repeatedly raised the same issues: "fact-pressures, if they can
be canalized and kept moderately repetitive, give us some fair quantum of wise
case-results." But whether courts get repetitive cases is a matter of chance,61
and having the cases is only a necessary condition for getting efficient rules:
Also needed are "a prophet and a suitable doctrine."62 Prophets, however, are
unusual: Holmes and Mansfield "stand out because of rarity."63 The rules
therefore should come at least in part from outside the common law system.
Llewellyn thus repeatedly expressed a preference for specialized decision-
makers. These were desirable both because of their expertise and because they
could develop specific rules. Llewellyn's preference for expert decisionmakers
was expressed early: "legislatures . . . though better adopted for general
policy-shaping than courts, are by both size and membership hampered in
doing the legal engineering. . . . Legislators, too, are only men, and in techni-
cal fields, laymen." An administrative tribunal is best: "It offers means of
developing experts specialized in their fields, of getting quick decisions, and,
above all, of getting a wealth of detailed specific rulings."64 Similarly, public
or quasi-public bodies could best effect law reform: It would be good to have
"the creation of some agency which serves in private law as the cop serves in
public law: an appointed person who will do what it has been discovered
George will not." Examples include the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and the New York Law Revision
Commission.65
Courts played a residual but significant role in the theory. Society faces a
scarcity of regulatory resources, but parties always can sue. In a discussion of
standard form contracts, Llewellyn said "administrative supervision . . . is to
be welcomed" but "new fields" emerge and agencies are hard to create. Conse-
quently, we need "a judicial technique built to face the problem in its always
new forms."66 And when public regulation of product quality waned, "then
private remedy on private agreement became the law's one immediate hope."67
Private parties also can fill the regulatory gap. After noting that juries may
not reliably understand commercial custom, he remarked, "This is one point at
which commercial arbitrators have a tremendous advantage over lawyers," and
he added that "for the mercantile man," the remedy for bad law lay in good
drafting and arbitration.68 Trade associations also could substitute for bad or
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absent law. A trade association could best develop "the working rules of a
technical activity"69 because, "In the self-government of sub-groups contract
provides an original framework, a constitution, a source of ultimate sanction in
dispute or breakdown."70 More precisely, trade associations reduce disputes by
specifying the quality obligation that sellers must meet and by providing the
parties with better decisionmakers than courts. Llewellyn, however, would
uphold trade association rules only when all affected parties participated effec-
tively in the trade association. The rules emerging from such a process would
be balanced, and thus as deserving of enforcement as ordinary contracts.71
IV. Illustrative Substantive Views
Llewellyn described himself as a "Contract theorist", and defined the role: "the
theorists . . . have as their first objective to state accurately and neatly what the
courts have been doing" and "to do criticism only after stating accurately and
neatly what it is that they are criticizing."72 Part IV first focuses on how
Llewellyn stated the law and then illustrates his mode of criticism. The object
is to give a richer statement of Llewellyn's theory by analyzing two of his
major concerns.
A. Stating the Law
The taught doctrine and the words of statutes, Llewellyn thought, differed
substantially from the law that courts applied. This theme pervades the articles,
but appears most clearly in the offer and acceptance papers. The first began
with the claim that the taught doctrine differed from the living law, and stated
the thesis that one can work up from the cases "a rather coherent and workable
body and moderately simple body of case-principle and even often clean case-
law about the formation of business agreements. . . ,"73
Llewellyn used the method of normal science to state the law - induction
from good data. An analyst using the inductive method states a preliminary
hypothesis, gathers the data, sometimes refines the hypothesis, and then tests it.
Llewellyn self-consciously worked in this way. He said, "The emphasis on
rules and, in our own case law, the particular emphasis on the derivation of
rules from case-to-case decision focuses particular attention on the problem of
induction."14 He then cautioned:
without a hypothesis which unambiguously means one thing, attempted observation or
research into new data or old is somewhere between 90 and 95 per cent waste motion.
Granted . . . that the hypothesis conditions observation. . . . Granted . . . that the shap-
ing and fixing (partly by the hypothesis) of the multicolored data in turn conditions the
conclusion. . . . The fact remains. Without the unambiguous hypothesis, no advance.75
In the offer and acceptance articles (and generally), Llewellyn's preliminary
hypothesis held that "case-law doctrine in Contract... is likely both to reflect
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life-conditions and to stay moderately close to them."76 The taught doctrine
then distinguished between bilateral and unilateral contracts. Under the former,
the offeror wanted a return promise as the acceptance so the offeree could
accept by promising. Under the latter, the taught doctrine took the offeror to
want a return performance as both an expression of acceptance and as the
consideration for the offeror's promise. Hence, the offeree could not accept an
offer to make a unilateral contract merely by saying that she would perform it.
This taught doctrine, Llewellyn thought, was inconsistent with practice: "in
life, expressed agreement does operate as a commitment. It just does."77
Typical parties thus would assume that both were bound when the offeree said
she would perform; the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts
"represents doctrine divorced from life."78 This led to the refined hypothesis:
"This [assumption by parties that there was a deal] is business; it is sense; it
will be surprising if it does not prove to be at least majority case-law."79
Llewellyn's admittedly nonexhaustive survey then showed that American
caselaw did not distinguish between bilateral and unilateral contracts; rather, a
seriously meant expression of assent commonly was held to bind the offeror.
Llewellyn's use of the inductive method was not unique. Arthur Corbin also
sought to infer the actual law from case data. The novelty in Llewellyn's
method was to assume that courts did (as well as should) further business goals,
and thus to derive his hypotheses respecting what the law was by asking what
rules would advance these goals. The weakness in Llewellyn's use of the
method also derived from its novelty: The method cannot be used correctly if
the analyst does not know what business practice is and why. As is well known,
Llewellyn took much of his knowledge of practice from appellate court opin-
ions. In a typical treatment, he once remarked that certain warranty contracts
had attracted so much attention from nineteenth century courts that one "is
forced to believe" that the contracts were "becoming familiar in practice."80 It
is preferable to look directly at the practice. Llewellyn also sampled cases
rather than collected them exhaustively.81 Llewellyn's views about what the
living law then was thus should be regarded as hypotheses, not facts.
B. Criticism and Reform
Llewellyn as a law reformer sought to implement the second and fourth
premises of his theory. These held that the state should create efficient default
rules (2) and enact transaction cost reducing rules (4). Llewellyn thus said of
the realist enterprise, "There is a strong tendency [of realists] to approach most
legal problems as problems in allocation of risks, and so far as possible, as
problems of their reduction. . . . To approach . . . business matters, in a word,
as matters of general policy."82 Llewellyn explicitly applied this approach to
commercial law. The introduction to his sales law casebook stated, "the book
. . . views the contract as a device for allocating various business risks; it takes
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up the presumptions [i.e., defaults] of Sales Law as a device for allocating risks
which parties have not expressly covered."83 The law could allocate risks with
default rules (he called them "yielding rules") or with mandatory rules ("rules
of iron").84 A fault of the Uniform Sales Act was to be unclear about which of
its sections were mandatory and which were not.85 This section of the chapter
examines three Llewellyn proposals to reform the law of sales. These proposals
illustrate a thesis of this essay: The premises of Llewellyn's theory were sound
but he often implemented those premises imperfectly because he lacked the
right economic tools.
1. SELLER'S ACTION FOR THE PRICE. Llewellyn sometimes pursued
transaction cost reduction explicitly when recommending specific reforms:
The applicable "general policy reasoning" is to have "speed and cheapness of
adjustment."86 In particular, the question of when the seller should get the price
should be answered on the basis of "a careful canvass of the business and
economic bearings of the competing choices."87 Llewellyn used this canvass to
conclude that the seller should be limited to damages if breach occurred when
the seller had the goods: "To force such goods on the buyer, when they are
reasonably marketable by the seller, is social waste. . . ." Making the vendor
resell when the buyer breaches after delivery, however, has two disadvantages:
The duty to resell would be "burdensome" for the seller and thus imposing this
burden on the seller would give the buyer excessive power in a renegotiation;
and the seller does not know the local market as well as the buyer does. "This
presents a case that tips the balance of social utility in favor of forcing title on
the buyer."88 This analysis remains apt in many markets today.89
2. COVER. The law when Llewellyn wrote permitted a disappointed promisee
to recover market damages - the difference between the contract and market
prices measured at the time of breach. Llewellyn argued that the promisee in
the alternative should be permitted to seek cover damages — the difference
between the contract price and the price of a substitute transaction. The avail-
ability of cover damages would permit parties to avoid expensive actions to
prove a market price. Cover also would facilitate renegotiation, which reduces
the costs of resolving disputes.90 When only market damages were available,
Llewellyn argued, a breached-against buyer would make a substitute purchase
at once; for if the buyer waited and the market rose, market damages would not
make the buyer whole: The buyer would have bought at a high price but will
have his damages measured by the lower price prevailing at breach time. The
market damage rule thus discouraged a buyer from attempting to salvage the
deal privately. The buyer, however, would negotiate with his seller for a
reasonable time after breach if he could have his damages measured by the cost
of a substitute purchase should the negotiations break down. "Given such a
provision [for cover], a buyer can negotiate with his defaulting seller with no
more fear of the market than afflicts any business man. . . ."91
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As with many of Llewellyn's specific substantive claims, the economics of
the argument are not exactly correct. The modern view holds that market prices
incorporate all publicly available information. As a consequence, market par-
ticipants perceive new price-affecting information as generated by a random
process. This implies that the next period's price for goods is today's price plus
interest plus an error term with positive variance and mean zero. Put less
technically, a commercial actor with rational expectations and no inside infor-
mation will assign an equal probability to market increases and decreases.
Applying this theory to the problem at hand, a buyer who could get only market
damages would face conflicting incentives. Contrary to Llewellyn's argument,
the buyer has a reason not to make a substitute transaction immediately. If the
market fell after breach, a buyer who waited to repurchase would profit from
default: He would have bought at a low price but have his damages measured
by the high price that existed on the date of breach. And as Llewellyn recog-
nized, the possibility of a price rise after breach creates an incentive for the
buyer to repurchase at once. Since the buyer would believe that a fall is as
likely as a rise, the buyer would assume that the price will not change.92 Such a
buyer would negotiate with the breaching seller if that seemed helpful and
otherwise purchase on the market. Giving a buyer only market damages thus
will not discourage renegotiation.
In addition, adding cover damages to the remedies a disappointed buyer can
assert would produce overcompensation. To see why, recall that when cover
becomes available, the buyer is permitted to measure damages at the more
favorable of two dates: breach or cover time. The buyer thus is given a free
option to speculate after breach. Because options are valuable, adding a free
option to the buyer's damage remedies overcompensates him.93 Llewellyn's
advocacy of a cover remedy thus was flawed in three ways: First, making cover
available will not increase the likelihood of renegotiation; second, it was
contradictory of Llewellyn to argue that the law should protect the expectation
interest and also permit a buyer to cover (because cover overcompensates); and
third, Llewellyn never analyzed the decisionmaker's real choice, which is
whether to facilitate deals by reducing the promisee's costs of proving damages
or to impede deals by adding a supra compensatory remedy.94 The primitive
state of financial economics in Llewellyn's time likely would have caused any
analyst to make these errors.95
3. SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE. Llewellyn's views on the perfect tender
rule illustrate well the strengths and weaknesses of his substantive analyses. A
strength is attention to context. He perceptively argued that perfect tender
("recision for minor defects") is appropriate for consumers and for buyers of
machines for use. In the former case, the rule "fits the case of the wallpaper
which is just enough off-color, or the radio which is just enough off true, to
edge the nerves." In the latter case, perfect tender is appropriate because "a
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machine even slightly defective can disrupt processes." Perfect tender is not
appropriate for manufacturing buyers of such inputs as "print-paper, chemi-
cals, leather, or wool" unless these are to be used in "the choicest manufactured
product." Perfect tender never is appropriate for mercantile buyers.
Llewellyn objected to a perfect tender rule in mercantile transactions be-
cause the rule would encourage what today is called strategic behavior: "It [the
rule] is an invitation to throw back the risk of any dropping market upon a
seller who has performed as a reasonable seller should perform."96 Buyers
would "throw back the risk" by rejecting on the basis of defects that would not
have produced rejection had the market gone their way. Such rejections are
breaches of the real contract that the parties thought they had made (which
imposed the risk of price increases on the seller and of declines on the buyer).
To enforce the real contract thus is to preclude rejection, but the real contract
also did not require the buyer to pay the full price for defective goods. When
the goods were "gradable . . . or moderately gradable," the custom, Llewellyn
believed, was to have price allowances. A decisionmaker would enforce the
true deal — premise (1) of Llewellyn's theory — by following this custom.97
Llewellyn's reform proposal was to generalize the custom by having the
legal default permit courts to bar rejection but order price allowances in
mercantile transactions. In 1940, he urged an amendment to the proposed
Federal Sales Act that would have banned rejection in sales between merchants
if "the delivery offered in no material manner increases the risk resting on the
buyer, and is of such character as to reasonably meet the buyer's operating
requirements, so that an appropriate reduction of the price can serve as ade-
quate compensation for failure of exact performance."98 An analysis of this
suggestion shows that Llewellyn did not appreciate the parties' contracting
concerns as well as a modern scholar would, and also did not study business
practice seriously. Llewellyn's proposed rule conditions on information that
courts will not have. The rule requires a court (i) to cost out "the risk resting on
the buyer" in order to decide whether the defective tender increased that risk in
a "material manner"; (ii) to know the buyer's production function in order to
decide whether the defective tender nevertheless "reasonably meets the
buyer's operating requirements"; and (iii) to trace the financial consequences
to the buyer of a "failure of exact performance." Information respecting these
issues commonly is unveriflable. That is, it seldom would be cost-justified for
parties to ascertain the actual risks the promisee faced, her production costs,
and her expected profits, and so to verify to a court data respecting these.
Default rules that condition on unverifiable information are objectionable
because they produce moral hazard.99 Here, a seller may attempt to force the
buyer to take a defective tender because, the seller may plausibly think,
the buyer could not rebut the seller's claim that the tender "reasonably met the
buyer's operating requirements." In addition, there seldom is a market price for
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.132.173.150 on Sun Dec 14 20:03:14 GMT 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527449.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory 31
every quality level of a product, from the perfect to the almost worthless. Thus,
establishing an "appropriate reduction of the price" for a defective tender also
may cost parties more in litigation expenses than they are willing to pay. The
evidence unsurprisingly suggests that merchants respond to the strategic rejec-
tion concern with rules more precise than this proposed law.100
Llewellyn's advocacy of substantial performance probably was consistent
with his advocacy of expert decisionmakers because there is some evidence
that he wanted the issue decided by a merchant jury.101 The availability of an
expert trier of fact, however, would not respond fully to the difficulty raised
here, for that difficulty goes less to a decisionmaker's lack of expertise than to
the decisionmaker's inability to access the relevant information (because the
parties will not provide it). Once again, an analyst writing when Llewellyn did
could easily miss this point because the economics of his time missed it.
In sum, Llewellyn encouraged the state to adopt efficient defaults and to
reduce transaction costs.102 This approach is now conventional. Llewellyn,
however, seldom could apply this approach productively because he lacked
modern tools of economic analysis. The approach requires the analyst to
understand commerce at the level of the individual transaction. This under-
standing is hard to acquire without a knowledge of game theory, transaction
cost economics, and finance. None of these economic specialities were well
developed when Llewellyn worked.103
V. Freedom of Contract
Llewellyn paid considerable attention to freedom of contract issues - see
premise (3)-because of the epistemological role that actual contracting played
in his theory. When parties contracted under ideal conditions, the deal would
maximize the utility of both. However, "free contract presupposes free bargain,
and . . . free bargain presupposes free bargaining."104 Hence, "where bargain-
ing power, and legal skill and experience as well, are concentrated on one side
of the type-transaction," the transaction is not necessarily efficient but rather
"is a form of contract which, in the measure of the importance of the particular
deal in the other party's life, amounts to the exercise of unofficial government
of some by others via private law."105 In such cases, judicial review or regula-
tion is necessary to ensure fairness: "When drafting [by the powerful] began to
gain ground, it thus became not only an enterpriser's measure, but a social
menace. . . . The menace calls for 'public' measures of control and cure."106
Llewellyn believed that there was less free bargaining in his time than
previously because of the increasing use of standard form contracts and the
growth of powerful trade associations and companies. As he said, "once . . .
[the] process of agreeing" involved the freedom to choose and "choice with
some inkling of consequence." But at the time when he was writing, there were
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standard form contracts and "differential knowledge, power and bargaining
skill. . . . This means need for control, lest old rules based on Adam Smithian
postulates be made tools of outrage."107
These views were the premise to Llewellyn's unconscionability thesis:
Contracts that are substantively objectionable ("lop-sided") should not be
enforced when the bargaining process that produced them was procedurally
defective. An unconscionable term commonly withdrew something that the
weaker party valued. A disclaimer, for example, eliminated warranty protec-
tion. Thus to hold disclaimers unconscionable is to make the warranty term
mandatory, and this is what Llewellyn believed should be done: "so far as . . .
rules of implied warranty are intended to control contractors, they must be rules
of Iron nature, and must therefore not be subjected to contracting out."108
When the structural factors that support a finding of unconscionability would
continue to exist, Llewellyn believed, the state thus should require the results
that it desires. Default rules are appropriate when bargaining power is roughly
equal. Otherwise, to permit contracting out of the law would result in "penaliz-
ing little men while bigger outfits bargain out."109
These perceptive views helped to organize the unconscionability debate that
began in the 1960s and continues.110 The views, however, were general. A
workable theory of unconscionability should provide criteria specifying when
a contract is too lop-sided to enforce and when a contracting process is impor-
tantly defective. Llewellyn was unable to develop these criteria. In their place,
he developed questionable concepts whose implication was that procedural
defects were ubiquitous. These concepts led him to be more interventionist
than his general theory otherwise would support. Part V thus continues a theme
of Part IV: Llewellyn helped to develop what is today the basic approach to
regulating contracts for fairness but could not apply this approach produc-
tively, in considerable part because he lacked the requisite economic tools.111
A. Substantive Unconscionability and Remedies
On Llewellyn's view, a contract is substantively unfair if it is "lop-sided," not
"balanced."112 A lop-sided contract imposes too many risks on one party. The
law is balanced— "Bodies of yielding rules [i.e., defaults] have grown some
balance in their allocation of risks and rights"113 — but strong parties create
imbalance when they contract out.
Llewellyn could not say how much imbalance was too much. He remarked:
"the policy of leaving. . . yielding rules free to change by individuated bargain
does not involve commitment to a policy of allowing displacement of the
whole set of yielding rules at once, and without individuation"; "there must be
decent balance in the frame of contracting which is to hold for all points not
individuated by the parties."114 These views only restate the question.115
Llewellyn did claim that a contract which shifted the quality risk entirely to the
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buyer was lop-sided,116 and advocated "legislative intervention, prohibiting
certain clauses and prescribing others. . . ."117 Apart from outlawing warranty
disclaimers, however, he never clearly said what legislatures were to do.
Llewellyn's unembellished directive to decisionmakers to achieve "bal-
ance" in contracting thus seems inconsistent with his belief that a good com-
mercial law rule will address to the courts factual questions that courts are
capable of answering. Llewellyn attempted unsuccessfully to resolve this ten-
sion in his thought by developing methods of analysis to guide judicial inquiry.
Initially, he rejected the standard judicial technique of construing the language
in unfair contracts against the drafter. Ignoring the drafter's intent would create
too much uncertainty. "No man is safe when language is to be read in the teeth
of its intent."118 Also, when a court strikes a term, firms using it respond by
drafting a substantively identical but linguistically different term. As a conse-
quence, the process of construing contracts against drafters is often wasted
effort.119
Llewellyn recommended two other judicial techniques. First, a court should
read the contract to contain what the weaker party would expect the contract to
contain. His earliest major article thus advocated giving "the insured . . . the
protection he might decently believe he was buying, without too close regard to
the exceptions of the policy."120 Fourteen years later, he argued that, "when
bargaining is absent in fact," courts should "read into" a form contract the
terms "which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that paper."121
One of the drafts of the Article 2 revision adopts this technique.122
The "reasonable expectations" standard on which the technique rests can be
either factual — courts should ask what terms a buyer actually should expect to
have purchased - or normative - courts should ask what terms a buyer would
expect the seller to offer if the seller were behaving fairly. Llewellyn appar-
ently wanted courts to employ the technique in both of its senses. Thus he said
that courts should strike terms that are inconsistent with trade practice.123 This
view implies a factual standard: Buyers actually would expect their seller to
use the industry term unless the seller said otherwise, so courts should read
contracts to contain industry terms. A substantive unconscionability inquiry
would be relatively predictable if the standard for the legally permissible were
the widely acceptable.
Llewellyn, however, did not want to limit the inquiry in this way. As said
previously, he rejected the idea that the law should follow a custom just
because the custom existed. Relevant here, Llewellyn believed that buyers
should be taken to expect terms that corresponded to the holdings in the
cases124 because the common law contained a set of balanced default rules.
Also, the common law refines notions of fairness in the course of deciding new
cases. A buyer thus could reasonably expect his seller to offer terms that
corresponded to current conceptions of fairness. Therefore, Llewellyn is plau-
sibly read as arguing that courts should use both the factual and the normative
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aspects of the reasonable expectations test when deciding whether a contract
term is substantively conscionable.
The difficulty here is that the normative aspect yields unclear rules. To see
why, realize that Llewellyn's use of a normative test is circular: He holds that
courts should give buyers what buyers expect, which is balanced clauses, and
that buyers expect what courts give them, which is balanced clauses. This
circularity exemplifies a general problem: A normative reasonable expecta-
tions standard necessarily collapses into some other substantive test. Under the
standard, courts should give the buyer what he is morally entitled to expect,
and he or she is morally entitled to expect substantively conscionable terms.
Thus, the normative reasonable expectations test merely restates the inquiry,
for the test reduces to a directive to courts to strike substantively unfair terms
and add substantively fair terms.125 Since Llewellyn devised the reasonable
expectations test because he was unable to distinguish what was fair from what
was not, his thought here is unhelpful.
Llewellyn's second proposed technique for guiding a substantive uncons-
cionability inquiry directed courts to focus on transaction types. "The proper
judicial aim seems to me to be here the fixing . . . of a basic minimum which
the bargain carries merely by virtue of being a bargain of that type. But that
would imply a limitation on contractual capacity. . . ."126 Llewellyn also re-
ferred approvingly to the English idea that "the quality obligation . . . is
something inherent in the deal: a basic minimum from which Contract may
spring-board but which Contract will not be allowed to undermine."127 And
again, courts should not enforce a standard term that is "repugnant to the
balanced nature of the type of transaction which the parties have obviously
entered on."128
Llewellyn appears to claim that sales transactions come in types that private
parties cannot alter. This claim could rest on the view that sales are natural
kinds whose essence is that sellers bear certain risks, such as the risk that the
goods will not perform in the described manner. Words in a contract could not
alter a particular transaction type's essence any more than calling a lion a sheep
will make the lion docile. If Llewellyn held this view, he would have made a
category mistake. The question for the state is not what a "sale" is, but what
terms in sales contracts should be legally enforceable. This is a normative
question. Thus directing a court's attention to a transaction's "type" also is
unhelpful.129
To summarize, Llewellyn's theory held that when true consent to a contract
was lacking, the state should instead enforce the contract that would be fair.
Llewellyn, however, could not develop criteria specifying when a contract was
fair - that is, substantively conscionable. This failure led him into inconsis-
tency. According to Llewellyn, courts should resolve questions of contractual
fairness by reference to a party's "reasonable" expectations, to a transaction's
"type" or to whether a contract was appropriately "balanced." These tests do
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.132.173.150 on Sun Dec 14 20:03:14 GMT 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527449.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory 35
not identify the facts that should tell a court whether to find for the seller or the
buyer. Llewellyn, however, justified his rejection of the title concept by argu-
ing against rules that did not call for clear factual inquiries. Recall Llewellyn's
claim that a court should allocate the risk of loss of the goods by asking which
party had possession of them when the loss occurred, not by asking which party
had title to them then. A consistent Llewellyn would also claim that a court
should decide whether to enforce a disclaimer by asking (for example) which
party had a comparative advantage at reducing the defect risk, not by asking
whether a disclaimer was consistent with a buyer's "reasonable" expectation or
a particular "transaction type." It is a puzzle why Llewellyn rejected unhelpful
concepts for some legal areas but not others.
B. Procedural Unconscionability
l. THE STANDARD APPROACH. Llewellyn was an important originator of
what has become the standard approach to procedural unconscionability. He
believed that bona fide consent to a contract term was absent when one side had
market power, or when one side was more sophisticated or knowledgeable than
the other.130 Llewellyn also believed that competition among sellers some-
times would protect buyers,131 but competition by "the contract-dodger" more
commonly will degrade "standards of performance generally." Apparently in
consequence of this latter phenomenon, the commercial "tendency" has been
to have "seller-protective instead of consumer-protective clauses."132
These views also were held on a high level of generality. The related
imperfect information and market power concerns are illustrative. A buyer
would be uninformed if he (i) was unaware of what the contract said or of the
legal consequences of the words used; (ii) could not evaluate the risks he
understood the contract to impose on him; or (iii) understood the deal offered
to him but did not know what offers competing sellers would make or were
making. Llewellyn never distinguished among these senses of the imperfect
information concept. These distinctions are important to make because the law
should, and now often does, respond to these forms of imperfect information in
different ways. Plain language laws respond to form (i), requiring firms to
quote contract terms in a standard fashion responds to form (iii) (by reducing
search costs), while no policy response to form (ii) is today generally con-
sidered to be efficacious.
Llewellyn also believed that market failure existed when all firms in a
market used the same terms. This assumes that the relevant unit of analysis, in
consumer markets, is the individual transaction. As Llewellyn recognized in
other contexts, however, mass transactions occur in these markets and it would
be inefficient to alter standard form contracts to suit the preferences of individ-
ual buyers. Therefore, buyers do best when the market itself is competitive, for
then every firm prices at cost and buyers receive the entire surplus that sales
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create. That all firms charge very similar prices or use very similar terms is
consistent with either a monopoly or a competitive equilibrium.133 In the
former case, consumers engage in little search about market alternatives be-
cause information acquisition costs are high. Firms commonly respond by
charging supra competitive prices. In the latter case, consumers engage in
considerable search, in consequence of which all firms are compelled to price
at the cost of the low cost producer.134 Thus nothing normative follows from
the similarity of prices or contracts alone. Rather, the decisionmaker must
evaluate the competitive state of the market in which the contract was made.
Llewellyn therefore deserves considerable credit for helping to invent the
conceptual vocabulary in which unconscionability discussions have been held
since he wrote, and to have introduced the useful distinction between pro-
cedural and substantive unconscionability. Llewellyn, however, deployed this
apparatus in a primitive way. Again, this largely is due to the primitive state of
the economic analysis of his time.135
2. AN EXTENSION OF THE STANDARD APPROACH. Llewellyn advocated
banning warranty disclaimers without direct evidence of defects in the bargain-
ing process. He argued that in the nineteenth century, "mercantile-mindedness
of any court leads towards widening seller's obligation, whether implicit or
constructive," and, "also to giving a decent buyer some remedy in the case in
hand."136 The doctrine that governed how different warranties related to each
other had become confused. Llewellyn thus proposed an amendment to the
Uniform Sales Act stating that courts should construe warranties as consistent
with each other, but if this could not be done the "order of preference" should
be that blueprints should control samples that should control merchantability
warranties that "arise without words." Llewellyn added a substantive proviso
to this interpretative section:
Provided, however, that any express clause negating or modifying warranties, condi-
tions or remedies provided by this [Sales] Act for the buyer is presumptively void; and
provided further that any party setting up such a clause shall carry the burden of alleging
and proving, first that the party against whom the clause is invoked has freely agreed
thereto; and second, that the clause lies within the reasonable region of self-regulation
by parties.137
Thus, a disclaimer could be unenforceable although the buyer has "freely
agreed thereto," if the disclaimer falls outside the "reasonable region of self-
regulation by parties." In line with this view, Llewellyn later suggested adding
to the warranty section of a proposed Federal Sales Act the words, "The
warranty herein is not subject to negation."138
Llewellyn recognized that disclaimers were widely used. Given his view
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that widespread contractual practices likely are efficient, a disclaimer thus for
him should lie within the "reasonable region of self-regulation by parties."
Excluding disclaimers from this region thus seems inconsistent with
Llewellyn's more general views. Llewellyn did not perceive an inconsistency,
however, because he thought that the usual warranty clause was the product of
procedural defects.
Llewellyn came to this questionable view because he took an ex post
approach to the subject. To see what is meant, suppose the buyer purchased
goods that turned out to be worthless and the seller had disclaimed warranties.
Llewellyn reasoned backward from the buyer's unfortunate position to the
contracting stage. A well-informed buyer would not consent to a deal that left
him with worthless goods. Hence, he said of cases that sought to help the
weaker party, "The lop-sidedness of bargain-result is thus taken as the mark of
lop-sidedness of bargain making,"139 and later that, "A bargain . . . shows
itself not to be a bargain, when lop-sidedness begins to scream."140 Procedural
defects were even more likely when the price was substantial. Llewellyn thus
approved of an alleged older practice under which, "In merchants' sales of
wares a sound price warrants a sound article, merchantable and proper to pass
as a sound ware under the designation. . . ,"141 It followed that a seller be-
haved wrongfully if she assumed no obligation respecting quality but charged a
sound price.142 The link between this conclusion and the existence of pro-
cedural defects is found in Llewellyn's approval of "Holmes' observation that
the price paid for a contract commonly negates expectation of unusual risk."143
In sum, the coexistence of broad exculpatory language with a high price almost
conclusively evidences defects in the contracting process.
The mistake here was to neglect the parties' contracting problem. A war-
ranty is an insurance policy that protects a buyer against losses attributable to
the goods. A full warranty — complete insurance — would create moral hazard:
The marginal cost to the buyer of reducing the probability of a loss would be
positive while the marginal gain from buyer investments in prevention would
be zero because the full warranty would already have protected the buyer
against any loss. Hence, the buyer would be careless. A common remedy for
moral hazard is coinsurance: The insurer—the seller—bears some risks, and the
insured — the buyer — bears others. The more risk the insured bears, the more
careful he will be. Therefore, both full warranties and complete disclaimers are
rare. Under the usual practice, the seller warrants against harms that she was
likely to have caused or which she could repair most cheaply, but does not
warrant against harms that commonly result from buyer misuse or against
which the buyer could best insure.144 Because informed buyers would agree to
bear some product risks, it is incorrect to infer bargaining failure from the
presence of uncovered risks alone. Rather, the analyst must either identify
bargaining failure directly or show that an efficient warranty contract would
have imposed on the seller the risk that the buyer was made to bear.
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Llewellyn's argument that high prices imply the existence of warranties is
similarly flawed. The argument can be illustrated in this way: Let a buyer
purchase a stereo system for $1,000. If the system were defective, it would be
worth nothing. When the seller charges $1,000, then, she is affirming that the
stereo is worth that much. Buyers expect to have remedies when seller affirma-
tions turn out to be untrue. Hence, the buyer who pays the $1,000 price expects
that the seller agrees to bear the quality risk — that the seller has made a
warranty. The error in this reasoning is to analyze the problem after sale. Then
the stereo is worth either $1,000 or zero. Buyer inferences respecting the
contract's risk allocation must be drawn at the time of sale, however, and the
stereo then is worthless only with a particular probability. If that probability is
low, then the product is worth a lot without a warranty, and will sell for an
appropriately high price. Hence, the contract price alone cannot support a
plausible buyer inference that the seller has made a warranty. This point
perhaps is clarified with an example.
Assume that a firm sells a stereo that is produced at a constant marginal cost
of c. The probability of a defect is n, and a defect makes the stereo worthless.
The firm makes a warranty that requires it to replace worthless units. The firm
thus must produce more units than it makes sales in order to be able to replace
nonconforming units, and the replacement units also could be defective. Solv-
ing this problem, a firm that warrants would have to produce 1/(1 - TT) units to
"support" each sale. If the firm sells x stereos in a period, its total variable cost
is cx/(l - ru), and the marginal cost is cl(\ - n). When the firm prices at the
minimum of its average cost curve (i.e. the market is competitive), the fixed
cost that each sale recovers is f. The stereo's price with a warranty thus ispw =f
+ cl(\ - 7i). The stereo's price without a warranty would htpnw = /+ c. Suppose
that f = $100, c = $1,000, and n = .01. The transaction price when the firm
warrants would be $ 1,110.10, and the price when it disclaims would be approx-
imately 1% lower, $1,100. This example shows that rational buyers would pay
almost as much for products with disclaimers as for products with warranties.
It thus is incorrect to claim that whenever the price is nontrivial, buyers expect
their sellers to have made warranties.145
To summarize, Llewellyn's advocacy of a disclaimer ban in merchant mar-
kets is formally consistent with his views on freedom of contract generally
because he believed that buyers did not consent to disclaimers freely.
Llewellyn, however, inferred this lack of consent from the property of
disclaimers to impose risks on buyers and the penchant of sellers to charge
prices that, given product failure, seemed high. This inference was mistaken.
When it is rejected, the inconsistency in Llewellyn's thought is restored.
Llewellyn's error here is understandable given the limited economic knowl-
edge of his time. He helped to develop what is now called the exploitation
theory of warranty, under which sellers disclaim warranties to exploit buyers.
A modern treatment of the subject concluded, "The exploitation theory . . .
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does not provide any explanation of the existence of warranties. Therefore, it is
unclear why warranties can serve exploitative ends."146 Explanations for the
existence of warranties, in turn, emerge out of the recent literatures on moral
hazard and adverse selection.
Again, Llewellyn had an intelligent approach to freedom of contract issues.
He recognized the epistemological relevance of the buyer's consent and the
need to develop substantive criteria of contract enforcement when free consent
is lacking. On a methodological level, he correctly held that procedural and
substantive unconscionability were jointly necessary and sufficient conditions
for nonenforcement. He also recognized that many equilibria in consumer
markets were (and remain) normatively suspect because information is costly
to acquire, structural market power sometimes exists, and consumers tend to be
less sophisticated than firms. However, he could not progress with the concrete
questions of when and how the state should intervene in consumer markets
given the economic tools available to him. And even on his own terms, his
freedom-of-contract views sometimes were inconsistent with his more general
views on how commercial law rules should be written and on the relevance of
widespread practice to efficiency assessment.
VI. Conclusion
Karl Llewellyn's contract theory can be analyzed on two levels of abstraction.
On the high level, Llewellyn's general approach to the legal regulation of
contracting behavior is powerful and current. Llewellyn understood that the
law had three tasks: to enforce the parties' deal when the deal was discernable,
to create default rules to complete incomplete contracts, and to mark the limits
of freedom of contract. Llewellyn justified the law's performance of the first
task on efficiency grounds and used the efficiency norm to help the law
perform the second task. Llewellyn's commitment to efficiency also informed
his analysis of freedom of contract, for he thought that efficiency was unlikely
when the bargaining process was conducted under much less than ideal condi-
tions, and the results of such flawed processes therefore were not entitled to the
law's deference. On the lower level of application of the approach, Llewellyn
seldom is relevant to us. Llewellyn could only work with the tools he had, and
those tools were too primitive for the task he set himself. It is difficult to make
much progress on the creation of good default rules or on developing criteria
for efficient interventions in markets without a knowledge of game theory,
transaction cost economics, and the economics of information. Because these
bodies of knowledge were created after Llewellyn worked, many of his partic-
ular applications were mistaken. In addition, Llewellyn was a poor empiricist
(at least in economic areas), and he was not always consistent in his thinking.
Nevertheless, Llewellyn's general approach easily accommodated itself to the
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.132.173.150 on Sun Dec 14 20:03:14 GMT 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527449.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
40 ALAN SCHWARTZ
use of new economic tools and indeed facilitated their introduction. In this
significant sense, he was the major founder.
Before turning to more general themes, it is worth remarking of the danger,
when doing interpretation, of finding what one is looking for. Llewellyn also
wrote in jurisprudence, sociology, and legal anthropology, and he has been
variously identified as a jurisprudent, sociologist, and anthropologist. He is
described here as a lawyer economist. This new description should not be taken
as an implicit rejection of the others. The different interpretation developed
above is partly explained by the use of a different data set - the contracts
scholarship - but the difference has a deeper cause. Llewellyn did applied
normative analysis in these papers: His central question concerned how the law
should best regulate sales transactions between merchants. There are today
protests against economic imperialism - can economic analysis explain sex?-
but it is becoming a consensus that economics has much to say about markets.
This essay's description of Llewellyn thus should not surprise, for its claim is
only that when Llewellyn wrote in contracts, he took an intellectual approach
that was appropriate to the subject.
As for the relevance of the papers discussed here to broader jurisprudential
issues, it will be helpful to set out briefly what have become the standard views
of realism:
1. Realists believed that the law inevitably is and should be instrumental; legal
rules should self-consciously implement policies.
2. Realists had an anticonceptual bias, which led them to reject broad analyt-
ical categories, such as "title" and "property," because these obscured what
was at stake when choosing rules.
3. Realists, however, were vague respecting what policies the state actually
should pursue. They tended to call for policy analysis rather than do it, and
many of them were ethical relativists.
4. Realists held a philosophically indefensible view of law, as being only a set
of predictions of what courts will do.
5. Realists were rule sceptics, who believed that precise rules could not bind
courts, and perhaps could not confine a decisionmaker's discretion very
much.
6. In consequence of (4) and (5), realists believed that there was no separation
between law and politics.
7. Realism was not a jurisprudence of the modern regulatory state, but rather
was court-centered - more so than the situation of American society would
warrant.
Llewellyn has been associated with all of these positions, and has been
defended against only (5).147 The first view does apply to Llewellyn, who
described himself as a legal reformer. There is little support in the contract
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articles for associating Llewellyn with the other positions. These articles show
that Llewellyn did not reject conceptual analysis or broad analytical categories,
but rather rejected legal concepts that directed to courts questions that courts
could not answer; he explicitly believed that the state should promote effi-
ciency by reducing transaction costs and by enforcing business contracts,
subject to a fairness constraint that he worked hard (though unsuccessfully) to
make precise; he rejected the view that the law was no more than a set of
predictions of official behavior; and he believed that rules could seriously
constrain a decisionmaker's discretion. Llewellyn did spend much of his time
with the law in courts, but out of a sense of necessity. He believed in the
superiority of regulatory solutions to many of the problems he discussed, but
also thought that there was a scarcity of lawmaking resources so that the ability
of parties to sue each other implied that the residual role of courts would
remain large in the contract field. Llewellyn did not address the relation
between law and politics in these papers because he believed he was addressing
problems that did not deeply divide people morally: The American ethos
implied the pursuit of efficiency in the contexts he considered, so for him sales
law raised technical rather than political issues.
This disjunction between Llewellyn as a contracts scholar and the views
that realists generally are perceived to hold raises a methodological point.
Realism on the ground may have differed from realism in the air. Perhaps the
substantive work of other realists should be read to see whether this distinction
holds generally.
Notes
This chapter benefited from workshops at Georgetown, Harvard and Yale Law Schools,
and a seminar at the Haas School of Business, Berkeley. Helpful comments also were
made by Bruce Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Jack Balkin, Richard Craswell, Hanoch Dagan,
Dan Kahan, Alvin Klevorick, Brian Leiter, Stephen Morse, Eric Posner, George Triantis,
Richard Posner, Steven Walt, and James Whitman.
The terms "contract theory" and "contracts scholarship" are meant here to include
Llewellyn's work on sales law. The scholarship is found in (1) The Effect of Legal
Institutions Upon Economics, 15 Am. Econ. Rev. 665 (1925); (2) Introduction to Cases
and Materials on Sales (1929); (3) What Price Contract? An Essay In Perspective, 40
Yale L. J. 704 (1931); (4) On Warranty of Quality and Society I, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 699
(1936); (5) On Warranty of Quality and Society II, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341 (1937); (6)
Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159 (1938); (7) The Rule
of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 Yale L. J. 1243 (1938); (8) On Our Case-Law of
Offer and Acceptance I, 48 Yale L. J. 1 (1938); (9) On Our Case-Law of Offer and
Acceptance II, 48 Yale L. J. 779 (1939); (10) Across Sales, on Horseback, 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 725 (1939); (11) The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 873 (1939);
(12) Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700 (1939); (13) The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26
Va. L. Rev. 558 (1940). Citations to these works are by integer, as in 3 at 705. Llewellyn
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wrote several articles advocating the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code after
1940, but did no further work in contract theory.
2. William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 368 (1973). Twining also
does not discuss these papers in The Ideal of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl
Llewellyn, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 119 (1993).
3. American Legal Realism, W. W. Fisher, M. Horowitz, and T. W. Reed, eds. (1993). See
also, e.g., Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale (1986) (extensive discussions of
Llewellyn, but none of his contract work).
4. E.g., Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76
Tex. L. Rev. 267 (1997); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996);
Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of
Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169 (1989);
Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 465 (1987); Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl
Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73
Geo. L. J. 1141 (1985).
5. The twelve articles that appeared in law reviews were cited 426 times between 1972 and
January of 1999. This would be a large number of citations for a modern set of private
law articles. The third article, What Price Contract?, was twenty-eighth on the list of the
thirty most-cited articles in the Yale Law Journal as of 1991, and was the oldest article on
the list. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from The Yale Law Journal, 100
Yale L. J. 1449, 1462-3 (1991). The citation figures for each article are (1) 16; (3) 130;
(4) 36; (5) 44; (6) 27; (7) 14; (8) 20: (9) 17; (10) 24; (11) 20; (12) 67; (13) 11.
6. The political constraints under which uniform law drafters work are analyzed in Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 595 (1995).
7. Anthony Kronman argues that Llewellyn's later thought on issues of method differed
substantially from his views in the period analyzed here. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost
Lawyer 196—201 (1993). For similar views, see William C. Heffernan, Two Stages of
Karl Llewellyn s Thought, 11 Int'l J. Soc. L. 134 (1983); Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr., Ameri-
can Legal Realism 147-54 (1968).
8. See, e.g., Aaron Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment
under Expectation Damages, 12 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 98 (1996); Benjamin E. Hermalin
and Michael Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A
More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J. Law, Econ. & Org.
230 (1993).
9. Llewellyn's theory sometimes collapsed the difference between substantive and pro-
cedural unfairness. A "lop sided" contract, he often said, is unfair because knowledge-
able parties would not voluntarily agree to it. Such a claim offers the substantive defect as
sufficient evidence of the procedural defect. Part V. A below pursues the implications of
this type of claim.
10. 10 at 725-6.
11. 8, n. 55 at 27.
12. 6 at 164.
13. 5 at 403. Llewellyn later said: "Almost any particular clause included in a deal represents
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the part ies ' joint j u d g m e n t . . . and this alone is good enough for letting i t . . . displace
and replace the general law." 12 at 700—1.
14. 10 at 725.
15. Ibid, at 734.
16. 6 at 175—6. Llewellyn 's view presupposed "mercantile outfits who have bargained on a
moderately equal footing." Id.
17. Ibid. n. 72 at 197.
18. 4 at 701. Llewellyn praised Mansfield because he "had laid down the root of the whole
mercantile approach to 'warranty': that it rests in contract." 4 at 719. Mansfield's
warranty theory is thoughtfully analyzed in James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-
century English Contract Theory: The View from Lord Mansfield's Notes, 76 Geo. L. J.
1949, 1969-79 (1988).
19. 2 at xiv. Again, "Dealers' obligations can be reckoned in terms o f . . . what the dealer has
engaged to deliver, rather than what in semi-tort he should be held accountable for not
delivering. . . . " 4 at 728.
20. 11 at 885.
21. Ibid, at 836. The sample warranty is express today but was implied in the nineteenth
century. For readers unfamiliar with Commercial Law, an implied warranty arises with-
out words. For example, when the contract is silent, a merchant seller is taken to
guarantee product quality; the seller makes an implied warranty of merchantability. An
express warranty is in effect a promise relating to quality—that the goods are machined to
a certain tolerance. The seller makes an express warranty by using words: The seller must
say that the goods are machined in a certain way.
22. The volume of trade would be relevant to risk allocation if there were economies of scale
to making warranties. Whether scale economies regarding the sample warranty existed in
the nineteenth century seems unknown, and Llewellyn did not consider the point.
23. Llewellyn saw, "'pictures in judges' heads of what trade looked like, and what trade
meant, as going far to determine what type of quality obligation they read into the dicker
of the parties . . . . Common to all [the nineteenth century cases] is a picture of the way
in which dickers of this kind typically happen, and so of how the parties ought to have
understood what was said and done." 4 at 719, 722. Courts who hold correct pictures of
what business parties want to do thus will construe commercial contracts correctly. This
is said in 11 at 880—1 and implied often, and is consistent with the modern notion that
"commercial norms will develop only if they provide merchants with a more cost-
effective method of adopting commercial practices on average than the alternative of
each merchant starting from scratch." Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of
Commercial Norms, 26 J. Legal Stud. 377-8 (1997).
24. Articles claiming Llewellyn believed that dispute-resolving norms were immanent in
practice, and that courts thus should discover and implement these norms, include
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 621 (1975); Kenneth Casebeer, Escape from Liberalism: Fact and Value in
Karl Llewellyn, 1977 Duke L. J. 671; Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Castles in the Air:
Blanket Assent and the Revision of Article 2, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 599 (1994); Allen
R. Kamp, Between-the- Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the
Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 Albany L. Rev. 325 (1995).
25. Llewellyn held that, "Disputes are the eternal heart and core of law. They do not mark its
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circumference, but they will always mark its center. . . . when two people are in a dispute
. . . not otherwise settled, . . . law shows its first societal value: the cleaning up of the
matter. . . . " Legal Tradition and Social Science Method — A Realist's Critique, in
Brookings Institution, Essays on Research in the Social Sciences 89, 91 (1931).
Llewellyn's general thought respecting law and the troubled case is described in Twin-
ing, supra note 2, at 160—1.
26. 3 at 722.
27. Ibid., n. 45 at 723. Practice nevertheless remains relevant because the decisionmaker
must act "in the light of the standing practices to which the new norm will be added, or on
which it places a limiting definition." Ibid. Modern scholars argue that appeals to custom
as a source of norms can be mistaken because norms can conflict, be vague, or were not
meant to apply to the type of case that gets litigated. See Paul Gewirtz's Editor's
Introduction to Karl Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America xx (1933, 1989); Jay
Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 678 (1984); Chris
Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1495 (1984). Llewellyn anticipated these views.
28. 6 at 162.
29. Ibid. n. 5 at 162.
30. 10 at 903. This was the second such disclaimer in these articles. In an earlier discussion
of how a counselor would be a little at sea when the decisions were inconsistent,
Llewellyn remarked, "This does not mean that I think that without practice there is no
law, nor that I think law must follow custom, even when custom is silly or wrong." 7, n.
39 at 1257. Llewellyn's thought here is consistent with the view that decisionmakers can
materially improve commercial norms with selective interventions. See Kraus, supra n.
23.
31. Modern scholars sometimes claim that Llewellyn wanted courts to resolve commercial
cases according to the court's "situation sense." It is unclear what this would mean
precisely — see Twining, supra n. 2 at 217—25, for a statement of the ambiguities — but
seems to mean roughly that a court which had a proper understanding of the facts could
infer the regnant norm and should follow it. A recent attempt to use the situation sense
notion to solve a concrete problem — when there should be a substantial performance
rule — is Todd Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contract: Of 'Default Rules' and 'Situation
Sense,' in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law 191 (J. Beatson and D. Friedmann,
eds., 1995). Llewellyn used neither the phrase "situation sense" nor the concept in the
articles analyzed here, and appears not to have done so in anything he wrote before 1941.
Rather, the "early Llewellyn" rejected the method of finding norms in practice.
32. 1 at 671—2. Recall Llewellyn's view that sales law raised mainly technical issues.
33. 8 n. 22 at 10.
34. William W. Fisher III included Llewellyn in his claim, "the Realists argued that most
extent legal concepts had to be disaggregated if they were to be of any use. . . . Concepts
like 'title', 'property right' . . . were hopelessly general." William W. Fisher III, The
Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the
Bill of Rights, in M. Lacey and K. Haakonssen, eds., The Bill of Rights (1994). The text
next argues that Llewellyn's dislike of the concepts Fisher mentions did not rest on their
generality.
35. 2 at xiv. See also 6 at 169-70; 10 at 728-36.
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36. 8 at 28.
37. Meaningful rules are "understandable and clear about what action it is which is to be
guided, and how . . . [and] must state clearly how to deal with the raw facts as they arise."
8 at 12.
38. As another example of Llewellyn's views, he said of George Gardner's An Inquiry into
the Principles of the Law of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1932): "He attempted a
restatement of Principles in Hierarchy; a beautiful and (for our modern case-law) a novel
idea; both method and substance deserve attention which they have not received. The
method not only of carefully formulating a principle, but of carefully formulating not a
single one ad hoc, but a number of competing principles, in the light of a whole picture;
and then not of simply posing them in competition, but trying to arrange machinery for
choice among them: this is almost as fine a contribution to juristic method as is Corbin's
relentless and unremitting search for and of the cases and his insistence on making any
theory square with them." 7 at 1267. Llewellyn added that he wrote (7) "in sudden worry
that some folk might think an attack on pseudo-rules, of case-law . . . to be an Attack on
Rules, or on Concepts at large." Id. at 1269. In the same vein, see Karl N. Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431 (1930).
39. 2 at xiii—xiv.
40. 10 at 887.
41. 4 at 726 makes the same point.
42. 5 at 404.
43. 3 at 748. See also 7 at 1266-7.
44. 13 at 561.
45. Ibid, at 564.
46. 5 at 381.
47. 13 at 563.
48. 2 at ix—x. Llewellyn later added
"A rule which states accurately the outcome of the cases, seen as cases, incorporates pro
tanto such wisdom on the cases as prior courts have shown, and such similarity of
reaction as courts are likely to continue to show. . . . [The rule] gives some guidance (to
the judge) about wherein his more personal judgments on such matters may be wisely
tempered. It further sets . . . the picture of how far he is or is not really free to move
unimpeded, and shows where the penumbra of his honest freedom lies to make further
use of the given multiple case-law techniques."
7 at 1257.
49. 2 at xx.
50. 8 at 19.
51. Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 Colum. L. Rev.
581, 587 (1940)
52. For example, "rules in the proper sense always have as their office to guide action." 8 at
11. In an earlier treatment, Llewellyn said an ideal caselaw rule would fit a consistent line
of caselaw, be announced in the cases as the rule, and would "appeal today as leading to a
just result." Such ideal rules would guide courts "with some sureness" and afford "a
counselor a moderately accurate prediction, and an advocate a solid base of case-
planning." 7 at 1256. Brian Leiter, supra n. 4, argues that the "Realists' Core Claim" is
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that caselaw results are predictable not because rules facilitate predictability but rather
because "psycho-social facts about judges" heavily influence decisions, and these factors
"are not idiosyncratic but characteristic of significant portions of the judiciary." Ibid, at
284. Llewellyn did not deny the relevance of "psycho-social facts" in the articles
reviewed here, but did believe that courts decided according to rules, so that knowing the
actual rules (rather than the doctrinal rules) would permit moderately accurate
predictions.
53. 8 n. 25 at 12. Llewellyn's belief that rules can be clearly put also is evidenced by his view
that "certainty is of the essence of mercantile law; business could not proceed without it."
10 at 733-4.
54. 1 at 670.
55. 11 at 901-2.
56. Ibid, at 900-1.
57. Since H. L. A. Hart, realists, including Llewellyn, commonly are read to define law in
this way. See, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 20—4 (1988);
Thomas W. Bechtler, The Background of Legal Realism, in Law in a Social Context 12
(1978); H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch. VII (1961).
58. 7 at 1248.
59. 8 at 10.
60. Ibid., n. 21. Llewellyn often distinguished the functions of lawyer and judge. In an earlier
paper, he stated that "prediction, not critique of wisdom, is the base-line job of the
counselor; whereas the judge has as one of his two base-line jobs to get a wise and just
result." 7 at 1256. And in a later paper, Llewellyn added: "For a counselor at work on
counseling, what the courts do is thus the most important part of law; whether, I repeat,
the doing is right or not. But judges (trial judges or appellate) cannot see law that
way. . . . the branch of Jurisprudence which deals with the judge and his function must
center no less upon the 'just' solution than upon the solution which other courts will
reach. . . ." Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40
Colum. L. Rev. 581, 593 (1940). Llewellyn also argued that Holmes' statement that the
law is only what courts will do was not meant to be taken literally, and was inconsistent
with much of Holmes' thought. See 8 at 13.
61. Some European states had set up "specialized tribunals" that were "built for canvassing
. . . trade practice. . . . But our own history shows that such specialized machinery is not
an essential condition to the coming about of such [good legal] results. Given time
enough. And given just a little luck." 11 at 874. The time is needed for cases to come, and
the luck is needed to ensure that the cases present repetitive fact patterns.
62. 11 at 876. See also 877, 879.
63. 8 n. 44 at 21.
64. 1 at 671-2.
65. 5 at 380.
66. 12 at 705.
67. 4 at 718.
68. 5, n. 132 at 392, 394.
69. 1 at 672.
70. 3 at 730.
71. That the contribution of trade associations at creating rules lay more in their expertise
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regarding commerce than regarding morals may be inferred from Llewellyn's view that
association rules sometimes "have carried lop-sided manipulation into the game of Sales
Law — and especially as against the ultimate-consumer buyer"; the state should check this
tendency. 5 at 394. Llewellyn earlier argued that trade association rules "may threaten the
unorganized consumer. . . . Until counter-organization of consumers develops, the only
help for such a case lies along lines of government action." 1 at 677. Modern scholars
extend Llewellyn's view to argue that the norms operative within private groups may
themselves be inefficient. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697 (1996), and Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1745 (1996).
72. 7 at 1259, 1269.
73. 8 at 1. Llewellyn previously remarked, "There is often enough very considerable implicit
and silent consistency in actual decision even when announced rules are at odds." 7 at
1252.
74. Karl Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method — A Realists Critique,
reprinted in Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 92
(1962).
75. Ibid, at 94.
76. 9 at 779.
77. Ibid, at 804.
78. 8 at 36.
79. 9 at 796.
80. 5 at 352.
81. Useful modern examples of inducting actual contract rules from exhaustive case surveys
are Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 687
(1990), and Edward Yorio and Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90,101 Yale
L. J. I l l (1991).
82. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism — Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 1222, 1255(1931).
83. 2 at xv.
84. 8 at 728-30; 12 at 704.
85. 5 at 384-5.
86. 6, n. 63 at 193. Llewellyn's acceptance of the efficiency norm has been remarked
previously. Twining, supra n. 2 at 126 (Llewellyn was "a pragmatic, old fashioned
American liberal, whose most important operative values were equality of opportunity,
individual responsibility and efficiency."); Allan R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the
Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49 ", 51 S. Methodist L. Rev. 275,283 (1998) ("There
are three themes that constantly recur in Llewellyn's thought: the primacy of trade
usages; the goal of modernistic efficiency; and the need for balanced trade rules.").
87. Ibid., n. 29 at 178.
88. Ibid, at 177. See also 10 at 735. The gulf between Llewellyn's method and that of earlier
scholars is illustrated by comparing Llewellyn's treatment of the seller's price action to
the doctrinal article, John Barker Waite, The Seller s Action for the Price, 17 Mich. L.
Rev. 282 (1919).
89. Another example of this mode of thought is Llewellyn's defense of the mailbox rule,
which holds that the acceptance of an offer becomes effective when the acceptance is
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mailed rather than when it is received. According to Llewellyn, the typical offeree
believes the deal is on when he mails his acceptance and so will begin to engage in
reliance. The typical offeror, on the other hand, will not think the deal is on until she
receives the acceptance, and so she will delay reliance until then. Therefore, holding that
the deal is on — the acceptance is effective — when the offeree mails it ensures that "we
can protect the offerees in all these deals at the expense of hardship on offerors in very
few of them." 9 at 795. This is a standard Kaldor-Hicks justification for a legal rule. The
justification may risk circularity, however, without an explanation of how the parties'
beliefs are formed. If the offeree believes that his acceptance binds because the law so
provides, then the offeree's belief cannot be urged as a justification for the law. Thus
Llewellyn's views respecting the mailbox rule are sketched only to illustrate his commit-
ment to reducing transaction costs.
90. 3 at 737-8; 6 at 180-2, 204; 13 at 568.
91. 6 at 209. Llewellyn recognized that parties could create a cover remedy for themselves
but argued that the law should provide the remedy to protect small, unsophisticated
firms: "But why should sane rules be limited to the use of the careful and informed who
can afford to pay counsel who are also skillful and informed?" Ibid., n. 39 at 182.
Llewellyn commonly justified the need for default rules on this ground. See, e.g., 5 at
393.
92. To make this point clear, put interest to one side, denote the current period as period t
and the next period as t + 1, and assume that the market price can rise by ten or fall by
ten. Then if today's price is p t, a buyer will assume that the next period price \spt + x =pt
+ .5(10) + .5( -10)=/v
93. This is an "other things equal" result for which limitations on recovering damages may
sometimes produce undercompensation, for which a free option would be a partial
remedy. In any event, the result may be clarified by an example. Assume that the market
and contract prices when the deal was made were 10 and the buyer valued performance
at 15. The buyer's expected profit thus is 5. The seller breaches when the market price is
12. Suppose that the legally reasonable time for cover would expire three days after
breach. Let the buyer in this example have the ability to cover when the seller breached
or any time thereafter. The buyer would wait until the third day. If the buyer covered at
breach time, he would pay 12, get damages of 2, and earn his expected profit of 5 (the 2
in damages plus the difference between his valuation — 15 — and the cover price — 12.). If
the buyer waited three days to cover and the day three market price is 12 or more, the
buyer would sue for cover damages and also earn his expected profit. For example, if
the market price on the third day is 14, the buyer earns 1 4 - 1 0 (damages) + 1 5 - 1 4
(profit on purchase) = 5. If the market price on day three is less than it was at breach
time, the buyer also will cover but sue for market damages, and thus will be overcom-
pensated. For example, let the market price on day three be 11. The buyer who waits to
cover but sues for market damages then will earn 1 2 - 1 0 (market damages) + 1 5 - 1 1
(profit on purchase) = 6. The value to the buyer of the free option that the cover remedy
creates — the value of waiting until the third day to cover—is positive because the buyer
can profit from a downward market movement but cannot lose from an upward one. In
this example, when the market is as likely to rise as to fall, the option is worth .50 (.5(0)
+ .5(1) = .50). Making cover available thus ensures the buyer an expected payoff in the
event of breach that exceeds his expectation: this payoff here is 5 (expected profit) + .50
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(value of option) = 5.50. A court using the good faith standard perhaps could require the
buyer to sue for the cover price rather than market damages when the buyer makes one
purchase, as in this example. However, plaintiff buyers usually are dealers who make
many transactions. A court seldom could restrict such a buyer to measuring damages by
any particular post-breach purchase. Dealer buyers thus could speculate in the fashion
described.
94. Parties prefer remedies that do not overcompensate. See Lars A. Stole, The Economics
of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information,
8 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 582 (1992); Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer
Supra Compensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100
Yale L. J. 369 (1990).
95. Modem examples of applying option theory to explain breach decisions and contract
remedies include Alexander J. Triantis and George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in
Contract Breach Decisions, 26 J. Legal Stud. (1997), and Paul G. Mahoney, Contract
Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1995).
96. See 5 at 388, 389.
97. Ibid.; 4 n. 118 at 731; 6 n. 86 at 205.
98. 13 at 566-7.
99. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 So.
Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 389 (1994).
100. See Bernstein, supra n. 4; Alan Schwartz, Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The
Utility of Bargains, 16 B. Coll. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 543 (1975) (rules of commodities
exchanges regulate breach more explicitly than the UCC rules). Regarding the influ-
ence of the three Llewellyn proposals discussed here, the UCC does not require buyers
who reject after delivery to resell, but the acceptance rules of § 2—606 sometimes can be
manipulated to reach this result; the Code adopts cover rules for buyers and sellers in
§§ 2-706 and 2-712; and the UCC rejects a substantial performance rule - see § 2 -
601 — but prevents a buyer who accepts from revoking acceptance unless the defects
substantially impair the value of the contract. See § 2—608. This rule raises some of the
concerns discussed above, and parties routinely contract out by using repair and re-
placement clauses.
101. A comment to § II-A of the Revised Uniform Sales Act (1941) (a version that Llewellyn
primarily wrote) advocated a merchant jury, explaining, "a court is rarely, and a jury
almost never, equipped to pass with sound mercantile judgment on such a question as
substantiality of a defect in performance in a particular trade."
102. Llewellyn's sensitivity to context also led him to recognize that relational contracts may
require different legal treatment than other contracts. There are, he reported, a set of
transactions that "lie half-way between mere reliance on the general spot market . . .
and property-wise assurance of either outlet or supply by vertical integration." These
deals include "output and requirements contracts, maximum and minimum contracts
. . . sliding scale price arrangements — these are symptomatic of an economy stabilizing
itself along new lines." In these arrangements, "long-range buyer seller relations come
to seem more important than exact definition of the risks to be shifted by the particular
dicker. . . . " 3 at 727. He later observed, "Our contract-law has as yet built no tools to
really cope with this vexing and puzzling situation of fact," and that, in "standing
relations," there is needed "a less-than-full contract damage type of sanction, for which
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no rules of damage have yet been evolved." 5 at 375 and 378. Llewellyn wisely did not
attempt to solve relational contract problems; the economics requisite to understanding
them are being created today.
103. As evidence for this claim, the American Economics Association once commissioned
Kenneth Boulding and George Stigler to identify the canon. See Readings in Price
Theory (K. E. Boulding and G. J. Stigler, eds., 1952). The editors focused on articles "of
general theoretical interest. We have followed the policy of not confining ourselves to
the most recent literature but have taken a comprehensive view of the economic
literature of the past forty years." vi. Of the twenty-five reprinted articles, only one
article, by Leonid Hurwicz, concerned game theory, and it was published in 1945. Of
the fifteen articles published before 1940, only Ronald Coase's article on the firm was
relevant to some of Llewellyn's concerns, but economists themselves did not appreciate
this relevance until many years later. A vivid description of the informal way in which
economics was done when Llewellyn worked is Robert M. Solow, How Did Economics
Get That Way and What Way Did It Get?, 126 Daedalus 39 (1997). Oliver W. William-
son also has observed of realists generally that their program was hindered by an
inability to do the relevant economics. See Oliver W. Williamson, "Revisiting Legal
Realism: The Law, Economics and Organization Perspective," Working Paper No. 95 -
12, Program in Law and Economics, School of Law, Berkeley (1996).
104. 12 at 704. See also 5 at 403.
105. 3 at 731.
106. 5 at 371.
107. 6, n. 25 at 175. Earlier Llewellyn observed "the most perplexing development of Anglo-
American sales practice: to wit, the spread of clauses of indecently broad limitation of
buyer's remedies, and even of total exemption of seller from responsibility." 4 at 731.
108. 5 at 386. Llewellyn did not use the phrases "procedural unconscionability" and "sub-
stantive unconscionability." They are used here because they are a useful way to
describe his thinking and because that thinking made possible the modern uncons-
cionability vocabulary.
109. 6, n. 47 at 185. The insight that default rules cannot remedy unfairness completely
because the powerful party can avoid them apparently is reinvented in each generation—
see Schwartz, supra n. 99, at 402—03 — and then ignored.
110. Llewellyn's 1939 book review (11) dealt almost exclusively with unconscionability
issues and was cited sixty-seven times between 1972 and today. Llewellyn's two
warranty articles (4 and 5) also had extensive discussions of unconscionability; these
two articles were cited eighty times in the same period.
111. Unconscionability problems usually concern mass transactions (large firms and indi-
vidual consumers). These transactions cannot be well understood without some compe-
tence in the economics of information, a field that George Stigler began in 1961. See
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961). For a
modern review, see Alan Schwartz, Legal Implications of Imperfect Information in
Consumer Markets, 151 J. of Inst. and Theor. Econ. 31 (1995). The discussion in Part V
omits Llewellyn's products liability thought. Prior commentators observed that
Llewellyn was among the earliest American scholars to advocate enterprise liability.
See James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products
Liability: A Case Study in American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist.
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.132.173.150 on Sun Dec 14 20:03:14 GMT 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527449.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory 51
443, 482-7 (1995); Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enter-
prise Liability Theory, 97 Yale L. J. 1131 (1988).
112. 1 at 673. He thus identified with approval "the equivalency-idea," allegedly held by
many courts, that bargains should be balanced. 3 at 745.
113. 12 at 704. See also Ibid, at 700-3.
114. Ibid, at 704. In discussing courts, Llewellyn added that the goal is "the marking out of
the limits of the permissible." Thus courts should strike "utterly unreasonable clauses."
12 at 704.
115. For an interesting analysis of the difficulties involved in defining substantive uncons-
cionability, see Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Uncons-
cionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 20-9 (1993).
116. E.g., 4 at 712, 718; 5.
117. 3 at 734.
118. 3 at 732. Dennis Patterson, supra n. 4 at 175, argues, "The new conception engineered
by Llewellyn [for interpreting contracts] presupposes that the meaning of the agreement
of the parties does not depend exclusively or even primarily on the written terms of one
or another document." Patterson does not refer to the contracts articles to demonstrate
this view. Llewellyn agreed that custom and practice can illuminate the written word,
but the Llewellyn of those articles would apply contract language unless it directed an
unfair result.
119. Ibid, and 12 at 702.
120. 1 at 673. Llewellyn thus anticipated Fredrich Kessler, who many years later advocated
this approach for courts exercising judicial oversight of insurance contracts. See
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion —Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943).
121. 12 at 704.
122. See Draft Uniform Commercial Code (1996) § 2-206(b): "A term in a . . . standard
form . . . to which a consumer has manifested assent by a signature or other conduct is
not part of the contract if the consumer could not reasonably have expected it unless the
consumer expressly agrees to the term."
123. 12 at 704.
124. Ibid.
125. This criticism of a normative reasonable expectations test for identifying and respond-
ing to unconscionable terms has been made by numerous authors. See, e.g., Craswell,
supra n. 116; Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 Yale L. J. 353 (1988); Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-
Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev.
1151 (1981).
126. 3 n. 62 at 733. A court enforcing the "basic minimum," in this particular discussion,
would override a disclaimer in order to permit the buyer to reject if the seller delivered
goods different from those ordered. Llewellyn probably would permit the court to
enforce the disclaimer in so far as it banned a suit for any consequential damages that
the erroneous tender caused. Ibid, at 732—3. The same idea respecting disclaimers
appears in 5 at 387.
127. 5 at 399-400.
128. 12 at 705; and also ibid, at 703 (courts will insist upon the "minimum decencies" that are
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"essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type, or as being inherent in a bargain of
that type") Traces of this position survive in comment 4 to UCC § 2—313, which recites
that "a contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and described.
A clause generally disclaiming 'all warranties, express or implied', cannot reduce the
seller's obligation with respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal
effect. . . ."
129. That a transaction type exists may be relevant to a finding of procedural uncons-
cionability. For example, if sellers routinely accompany the sale of a particular product
with a warranty, then a contract to sell that product with a disclaimer might surprise the
buyer. This analysis would not make the warranty an "iron" term that sellers could not
disclaim, but it would require a seller who uses a nonstandard disclaimer to bear a
heightened disclosure burden.
130. See, e.g., 1 at 673; 3 at 731.
131. 1 at 678.
132. 3, n. 47 at 725 and 734.
133. A monopoly equilibrium exists when there are many firms but each charges the price
that a single monopolist would have charged.
134. See Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387(1983).
135. Modern views respecting procedural unconscionability and related doctrines are sum-
marized in Richard Craswell and Alan Schwartz, Foundations of Contract Law 287—
341 (1994).
136. 5 at 358.
137. Ibid., n. 58, 364-5.
138. 6 at 207. Llewellyn later justified the need for sales law reform in part because some
courts failed to read the Uniform Sales Act to obtain just results. "An instance is found
in the whole series of difficulties over implied warranty, and over the degree to which or
manner in which various warranty-responsibilities can be avoided in transactions in
which they should be present." 13 at 560. See also the earlier statement in 5 at 384—5:
"the one thing which should never be allowed to be negated—at least as a condition, . . .
is a description when taken seriously. . . . Surely a case is to be made for [Uniform
Sales Act] Section 14 . . . being an iron section whose effect no agreement can up-
set. . . ." Llewellyn meant here that if the seller described the goods as grade A but the
contract recited that the buyer bears the risk that the goods might turn out to be another
grade, the buyer "at least" should be permitted to reject grade B goods, and perhaps
should be permitted to assert the other buyer remedies.
139. 3 at 744.
140. 5 at 402.
141. 10 at 743; also at 726 and 741. In eighteenth century England, a warranty of quality may
have been implied on the basis of a sound price only when the seller was aware of the
defect at the time of sale. See Oldham, supra n. 18, at 1977—8.
142. 5 at 400-1.
143. 12 at 702. This idea also appears in comment 4 to UCC § 2—313, where courts are
advised to give "consideration . . . to the fact that the probability is small that a real
price is intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation."
144. See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Commercial Law: Principles and Policies
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204—7 (2d ed., 1991). Llewellyn thus mistakenly said of what is now the standard
warranty for manufactured goods, under which the seller agrees to repair or replace
defective parts for a limited period but precludes rejection for minor defects and
excludes recovery for consequential damages, "that precious commodity Justice must
be viewed as being as scarce as the scarce economic goods." 5 at 400—1.
145. The driving force in this example apparently is the low failure probability. If the failure
probability were 3%, however, the disclaimer price would be 97.3% of the warranty
price. Failure probabilities above 3% for standard manufactured products seem uncom-
mon. Also, if the ratio of fixed to variable costs were higher, the price difference would
be smaller. In the example above, if the seller's fixed cost were $300 per unit and her
variable cost $800, a disclaimer would reduce the price by $8 on an $1,100 item. The
UCC permits sellers to disclaim implied warranties — see § 2—316(2) — but also permits
courts to strike these disclaimers under § 2—302 if they are unconscionable.
146. Winand Emons, The Theory of Warranty Contracts, 3 J. Econ. Surveys 43, 54 (1989).
147. Neil Duxbury observed that Llewellyn, "far from being a typecast rule-sceptic, was
adamant that rules 'guide' judicial decision-making." See The Reinvention of American
Legal Realism, 12 Legal Stud. 137, 143 (1992) (footnote omitted). Fisher also noted
Llewellyn's belief that rules could confine decisionmakers. On the other hand, Bechtler,
supra n. 57 at 25, Leiter, supra n. 4, Fisher, and others associate Llewellyn with rule
scepticism. Twining frequently suggests that Llewellyn was an ethical relativist.
Llewellyn has been associated with the position that legal realists were not interested in
policy on the basis of his view, expressed in Some Realism about Realism—Responding
to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 (1931), that scholars should put the normative
aside for a time in order to study how the legal system actually works. Fisher associates
Llewellyn, among others, with having undermined democratic theory, a part of view
(6), by allegedly showing that "judges deciding individual controversies often derive
little guidance if any from statutes (enacted by elected representatives of the people) or
from common law rules (implicitly democratically ratified through the legislature's
inaction). . . ." Fisher, supra n. 34, at 284. The preceding notes show that Llewellyn has
been identified with the other positions. One could add to the list that realists believed
scholars should do empirical research about how law affects society. Llewellyn was
sympathetic to this project, but was not an empiricist when wearing his contract scholar
(as contrasted with his sociologist) hat.
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